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I. INTRODUCTIONO N April 20,1994, death row inmate Gary Graham received news
that the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals opened yet another
door through which Graham can pursue his claims of actual in-
nocence.' This judgment, the latest in a continuing legal battle over the
fate of Gary Graham, fails to provide a satisfactory answer to the ques-
tion that the Supreme Court grappled with in Herrera v. Collins:2 What
does the Due Process Clause 3 of the Constitution require when a prisoner
has a claim of "actual innocence" supported by newly discovered evi-
dence? Gary Graham, like Leonell Torres Herrera before him, claims
that the Due Process Clause prevents the state from executing an individ-
ual who possesses new exonerating evidence.
A due process challenge is normally appropriate if the defendant
claims that the state is punishing him without having made an appropriate
determination of guilt.4 The question presented by the Graham case is
not, however, whether the Due Process Clause allows the state to execute
an innocent man, because the defendant has been tried and convicted
and, consequently, the presumption of his innocence has vanished.5 The
question is, rather, whether the state must provide a post-conviction ave-
nue by which a prisoner can introduce newly discovered evidence of his
innocence,6 and if so, what the appropriate avenue is. The Supreme
Court has held that in a state criminal proceeding "the trial is the para-
mount event for determining the guilt or innocence of the defendant."'7
Therefore, while the presumption of innocence plays a vital role in our
justice system at the trial level,8 in post-conviction proceedings the de-
fendant comes before the court not as an innocent person but as a con-
victed criminal. 9
Graham first raised his "actual innocence" defense in a habeas corpus
petition five years after his conviction.' 0 Traditionally, courts have not
considered the discovery of new evidence purporting to exonerate the
accused to be a valid ground for habeas corpus relief." Gary Graham
1. State ex rel. Holmes v. Honorable Court of Appeals for the Third District, No.
71,764, 1994 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 52 (Tex. Crim. App. Apr. 20, 1994).
2. 113 S. Ct. 853 (1993).
3. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; TEx. CONST. art. I, § 2.
4. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 n.16 (1979).
5. Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 870 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
6. Amicus Curiae Brief in Support of Respondent at 19, Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct.
853 (1993) (No. 91-7328).
7. Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 869.
8. Bell, 441 U.S. at 533.
9. Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 870 (O'Connor, J., concurring). O'Connor maintained that
the execution of a truly innocent person would violate the Constitution, but claimed that
Herrera was not innocent "in any sense of the word." Id.
10. State ex rel. Holmes v. Third Court of Appeals, 860 S.W.2d 873 (Tex. Crim. App.
1993).
11. Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 317 (1963); Ex parte Binder, 660 S.W.2d 103, 106
(Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (Ex parte Binder has been overruled to the extent that it conflicts
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maintains that this policy violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments to the Constitution because it would allow an innocent person to
be executed. The Supreme Court has previously rejected this argument
and held in Herrera v. Collins,12 a case very similar to Graham's, that the
criminal justice procedures already in place adequately protect an ac-
cused's constitutional rights.13 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals ap-
plied this rule to the Graham case and originally refused to hear his claim
of actual innocence on collateral appeal absent some constitutional viola-
tion.14 Collateral appeals put additional costs and burdens on the system
which are not justified by the possible minute decrease in the risk of exe-
cuting an innocent person.15
These costs and burdens of additional post-conviction remedies are
also unnecessary because defendants possessing allegedly exonerating ev-
idence already have adequate and more appropriate avenues to pursue.
First, if the evidence was available at the time of trial and was not brought
forth because of incompetence or lack of due diligence on the part of
counsel, then the appropriate avenue for relief is a constitutional claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel.' 6 Society appears to have lost confi-
dence in the reliability of criminal adjudications, 17 but much of that confi-
dence could be restored by ensuring that all defendants have quality
representation at the trial level.18 Second, if the evidence has come to
light since trial, but too late to file a motion for new trial, and this evi-
dence is truly persuasive as to the accused's innocence, then the accused
can seek executive clemency. 19
Graham is now, however, challenging the constitutionality of these
clemency procedures as well. After the court refused to examine Gra-
ham's new evidence in the habeas corpus context as per Herrera, Graham
filed another petition alleging that the Texas Board of Pardons and Pa-
roles violated his due process rights by denying him executive relief with-
out the benefit of a hearing on his application. 20 The Texas Supreme
Court has yet to rule on this, Graham's latest attack on the constitutional-
ity of the Texas criminal justice system. Unfortunately, the Texas Court
of Criminal Appeals, while vacating a civil injunction preventing Gra-
with the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals' decision in State ex rel. Holmes v. Honorable
Court of Appeals for the Third District, No. 71,764, 1994 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 52 (Tex.
Crim. App. Apr. 20, 1994).
12. 113 S. Ct. 853 (1993).
13. Id. at 860.
14. Ex parte Graham, 853 S.W.2d 565, 566 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).
15. See infra section VIII.
16. The Court of Criminal Appeals refused to grant relief to Graham on the ground of
ineffective assistance of counsel. Ex parte Graham, 853 S.W.2d at 565.
17. Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judg-
ments, 38 U. Cm. L. REV. 142, 145 (1970).
18. Richard L. Huff, A Further Inquiry Into the Quality of Indigent Felony Defense, 6
ST. MARY'S L.J. 586 (1974).
19. Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 869.




ham's execution, opened the door to yet another habeas corpus proceed-
ing based on Graham's claim of actual innocence.
21
This comment will attempt to detail the procedures already in place for
a defendant to attack his trial-court conviction, analyze the claims that
Graham has made regarding the adequacy of these procedures,2 2 and ex-
plain why the author believes that the state already adequately protects
21. State ex rel. Holmes, 1994 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 52; see also infra notes 158-65
and accompanying text.
22. A chronology of Graham's procedural history to date, as compiled by Houston
reporter Dalton Smith, may prove helpful:
May 13, 1981 - Bobby Grant Lambert murdered.
October 28, 1981 - Gary Graham convicted.
June 12, 1984 - Conviction and sentence affirmed by Texas Court of Criminal Appeals.
July 30, 1987 - First scheduled date for execution.
February 19, 1988 - Habeas corpus relief denied by the Court of Criminal Appeals
(after execution date changed three times).
August 31, 1988 - Federal district court denied habeas relief and Graham given stay of
execution by U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, but then affirmed in district court.
July 3, 1989 - U.S. Supreme Court vacates Fifth Circuit judgment and remands the case
to appeals court.
March 7, 1990 - On review, the Fifth Circuit panel reverses the state district court.
January 3, 1992 - Fifth Circuit en banc reverses the Fifth Circuit panel and affirms the
denial of habeas relief.
January 8, 1992 - U.S. Supreme Court grants certiorari.
January 25, 1993 - U.S. Supreme Court affirms the Fifth Circuit ruling of January 3,
1992.
March 11, 1993 - Execution scheduled for new date of April 29.
April 26, 1993 - Graham seeks habeas relief in state district court of conviction, first
raising claim of "actual innocence" denied by trial court.
April 27, 1993 - Court of Criminal Appeals denies relief and stay of execution.
April 28, 1993 - Governor Ann Richards grants 30-day reprieve (despite 10-7 vote by
Board of Pardons and Paroles against reprieve).
May 23, 1993 - Graham requests executive clemency for second time from Board of
Pardons and Paroles (three days before first reprieve is to run out). Board decides not to
act on second request for clemency.
May 24, 1993 - Certiorari denied by U.S. Supreme Court.
June 2, 1993 - Graham requests reconsideration by Court of Criminal Appeals which
partially granted request and stayed execution pending outcome of another death penalty
case ruling.
July 7, 1993 - Trial court sets execution date for August 17.
July 21, 1993 - Graham seeks injunction and mandamus in civil district court in Austin
(299th Judicial District) for evidentiary hearing before Board of Pardons and Paroles.
August 9, 1993 - State Civil District Judge Peter Lowery of Austin signs letter of stay
August 3, but then signs order on August 9 ordering hearing by Board of Pardons and
Parole to be held August 10.
Harris County District Attorney John Holmes asks Court of Criminal Appeals for leave
to file writ of prohibition and/or mandamus against Judge Lowery.
August 12, 1993 - Court of Criminal Appeals denies Holmes's request because appeal
to Third Court of Civil Appeals of Texas (in Austin) vacated injunction order of Judge
Lowery.
August 13, 1993 - Graham seeks stay of execution from Third Court of Civil Appeals,
which grants writ enjoining execution pending resolution of appeal. Graham also seeks
habeas relief for the second time from U.S. district court and appeals to Fifth Circuit. That
appeal was still pending as of the date of this comment.
August 15, 1993 - Court of Criminal Appeals grants stay of execution on its own mo-
tion (by 5 to 4 vote).
November 9, 1993 - Court of Criminal Appeals reconsiders motions and grants leave to




the rights of death-row inmates and that additional procedures are not
only unnecessary, but would not be effective even if implemented.
II. DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENTS
Gary Graham has exhausted the normal appeals and post-conviction
relief process.23 He now claims to possess newly-discovered evidence
that will exonerate him, and maintains that he has a due process right to a
hearing on that evidence.24 The Due Process Clause of the United States
Constitution provides that no "state [shall] deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law."'25 The Texas Constitu-
tion contains a similar provision in its Bill of Rights,26 as does every state
in this nation.27 The Supreme Court has determined that the Due Pro-
cess Clause requires two things: fundamental fairness and rationality.28
A state's criminal procedures do not violate due process unless they "of-
fend[ ] some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience
of our people as to be ranked fundamental," 29 or "shock[ ] the con-
science."'30 Consequently, the Supreme Court is quite hesitant to use the
Due Process Clause as a means to promulgate state rules of criminal pro-
cedure.31 The Bill of Rights enumerates many constitutional criminal
safeguards and the Court has not felt it necessary to interfere with state
legislative judgment and expand those safeguards under the "open-ended
rubric of the Due Process Clause."'32
III. STATE'S DISCRETION
The United States Constitution delegates administration of the crimi-
nal justice system largely to the individual states.33 As mentioned above,
a state's procedures do not violate the Due Process Clause merely be-
cause other methods or procedures might be more fair or provide a
April 20, 1994 - Court of Criminal Appeals enters order vacating civil court injunction,
but opens new door for post conviction habeas corpus relief where a claim of actual inno-
cence is based on newly discovered evidence.
Dalton Smith, Gary Graham Has Been Treated Fairly, But People of Texas Haven't Been,
Hous. CHRON., May 1, 1994, 2 STAR Edition, at 4.
23. State ex rel. Holmes v. Third Court of Appeals, 860 S.W.2d 873, 875 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1993),(Clinton, J., concurring).
24. Ex parte Graham, 853 S.W.2d at 566.
25. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
26. "No citizen of this State shall be deprived of life, liberty, property, privileges or
immunities, or in any way disenfranchised, except by the due course of the law of the
land." TEX. CONST. art. I, § 19; TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 1.04 (Vernon 1977).
27. David Richards & Chris Riley, Developing a Coherent Due-Course-of-Law Doc-
trine, 68 TEX. L. REV. 1649, 1650 (1990).
28. Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 637 (1991).
29. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 523 (1958) (.quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291
U.S. 97, 105 (1934)); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169 (1952).
30. Rochin, 342 U.S. at 172.
31. Medina v. California, 112 S. Ct. 2572, 2576 (1992).
32. Id.
33. Medina, 112 S. Ct. at 2577; Schad, .501 U.S. at 638.
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"surer promise of protection to the prisoner at the bar."'34 States are
given discretion in formulating their own criminal procedures and safe-
guards.35 The Constitution does not even require that states provide an
appeals process "however grave the offence of which the accused is con-
victed."' 36 Prisoners also have no constitutional right to collateral attack
or habeas corpus review. 37 In fact, habeas corpus is a purely civil remedy,
rather than an integral part of the criminal justice process.38 The
Supreme Court held this rule applicable even to capital cases.39 States
have in their discretion, however, historically provided two avenues for
review of state criminal proceedings; direct appeal and habeas corpus.40
A. DIRECT APPEALS
All states now provide some method of appeal from criminal convic-
tions.41 A direct appeal attacks errors of law that are apparent from the
record. Errors of fact are not open to review.4 2 While the Constitution
does not guarantee a defendant the right to appeal, 43 when a state does
decide to provide such an avenue, the Constitution provides equal protec-
tion 44 and due process guarantees. 45 Moreover, once the state establishes
the process, the courts cannot diminish it.46 In addition to the establish-
ment of an appeals process, most states provide that the courts must in-
form a defendant of his right to appeal at the time of sentencing. 47
34. Rochin, 342 U.S. at 168.
35. Id.
36. McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 687 (1894); see also Andrews v. Swartz, 156 U.S.
272, 274-75 (1895). Due process "does not require the state to adopt a particular form of
procedure, so long as it appears that the accused has had ... an adequate opportunity to
defend himself in the prosecution." Rogers v. Peck, 199 U.S. 425, 435 (1905).
37. United States v. MacCollom, 426 U.S. 317, 323 (1976).
38. Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 8 (1989); Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551,
556-57 (1987); MacCollorn, 426 U.S. at 323; Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 423-24 (1963).
39. Murray, 492 U.S. at 10.
40. Finley, 481 U.S. at 556-57.
41. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
42. 4 TEX. JUR. 3d Appellate Review § 2 (1980).
43. McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684 (1894); see also Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600
(1974); Griffin, 351 U.S. at 12.
44. See, e.g., Griffin, 351 U.S. at 12 (holding that indigent defendants were entitled to a
free trial transcript); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 356 (1963) (holding that an indi-
gent defendant was entitled to an appeal decision in which the "appellate court passes on
the merits of his case only after having the full benefit of written briefs and oral argument
by counsel").
45. See, e.g., North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711,724 (1969) (holding that a defend-
ant's "exercise of a right of appeal" must be "free and unfettered").
46. 4 TEX. JUR. 3d Appellate Review § 3 (1980).
47. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(a)(2):
After imposing sentence in a case which has gone to trial on a plea of not
guilty, the court shall advise the defendant of the defendant's right to appeal
and of the right of a person who is unable to pay the cost of an appeal to
apply for leave to appeal in forma pauperis. There shall be no duty on the
court to advise the defendant of any right of appeal after sentence is imposed
following a plea of guilty or nolo contendere. If the defendant so requests,
the clerk of the court shall prepare and file forthwith a notice of appeal on
behalf of the defendant.
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The right to appeal is not synonymous with the right of the defendant
to obtain review of every issue. First, the appellate courts will not con-
sider objections that were not properly presented at trial and, therefore,
not ruled on by the trial judge.48 Second, appellate courts will not review
questions of fact at all.49 Finally, appellate courts will not consider a
"harmless error" that did not prejudice the defendant, even if it was prop-
erly raised and perfected.50 The policy behind this rule is that "[a] de-
fendant is entitled to a fair trial but not a perfect one."' l
B. HABEAS CORPUS
In addition to direct appeal, the Texas Constitution provides that pris-
oners have a right to habeas corpus and that this right may not be sus-
pended.52 The federal courts can assume jurisdiction if the prisoner has
been denied a constitutional right and a federal court may discharge from
custody any person restrained by state courts in violation of the United
States Constitution.53 Today, after much expansion, proper grounds for
habeas corpus review include jurisdictional defects and denials of funda-
mental constitutional rights.5 4 Title 28 of the United States Code, section
2255, provides that habeas corpus relief is available when: "the sentence
was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States,
or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that
the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is other-
wise subject to collateral attack .... ,,5 In other words, habeas corpus is
appropriate only if the defendant has been denied the "substance of a fair
trial."'56 To avoid federal fact-finding in state cases then, the state must
merely ensure that its fact-finding procedures are adequate. 57
The United States Code provides that the state court's findings of fact
are presumed correct unless the defendant can show that an exception
applies. 58 The exceptions include showing that a "factfinding procedure
employed by the State court was not adequate to afford a full and fair
hearing,. . . the applicant did not receive a full, fair, and adequate hearing
in the State court proceeding.... [or] the applicant was otherwise denied
due process of law in the State court proceeding. '59 In other words, the
48. Wayne R. LaFave, Appeal, I ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE 62, 62 (Kad-
ish ed., 1983).
49. 4 TEX. JUR. 3d Appellate Review § 2 (1980).
50. FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a) defines harmless error as "any error, defect, irregularity or
variance which does not affect substantial rights."
51. Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604, 619 (1953).
52. "The writ of habeas corpus is a writ of right, and shall never be suspended. The
Legislature shall enact laws to render the remedy speedy and effectual." TEX. CONST. art.
I, § 12; see also TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 1.08 (Vernon 1977).
53. Rogers v. Peck, 199 U.S. 425, 432 (1905).
54. Ex parte Banks, 769 S.W.2d 539, 540 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989).
55. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1988).
56. Howell v. United States, 172 F.2d 213, 215 (1949).
57. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 411 (1986).




defendant must point to a specific constitutional right that was abridged
or a particular unfairness concerning the trial that would imply that his
due process rights were denied.60 Habeas corpus review focuses on the
legality of the proceedings, not the merits of the case. 61 The relevant
inquiry is "whether the totality of state process assures us of a reasoned
probability that justice is done, rather than whether in some ultimate
sense the truth was in fact found." 62
In his case, however, Gary Graham is not pointing to a particular con-
stitutional violation, but instead he is claiming that he is "actually inno-
cent" of the crime for which he was convicted. Habeas corpus gives
federal courts the power only to question the state court's procedure, not
to question the jury's determination of the facts. 63 The court does not
judge the defendant's guilt or innocence, but rather the legality of his
detention.64 New evidence, even when purporting to prove "actual inno-
cence," is not a valid ground for collateral attack either in Texas courts65
or federal courts, 66 because the trial court is more familiar with all the
circumstances of the trial and is therefore a more appropriate place to
make determinations of fact.67 Even though newly discovered evidence
is never grounds for habeas corpus relief, under some circumstances it
can be grounds for a new trial.68
C. MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
A motion for a new trial is appropriate in some cases of newly discov-
ered evidence, but it is not the appropriate remedy for Gary Graham.
Both Texas courts69 and federal courts70 have the authority to grant a
new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence. In order for new
evidence to constitute grounds for a new trial, however, the defendant
must prove:
1st. That the evidence has come to his knowledge since the trial. 2d.
That it was not owing to the want of due diligence that it did not
come sooner. 3d. That it is so material that it would probably pro-
duce a different verdict, if the new trial were granted. 4th. That it is
60. United States v. Kaplan, 101 F. Supp. 7, 13 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
61. Ex parte Binder, 660 S.W.2d 103, 104-05 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988) (citing Shaver v.
Ellis, 255 F.2d 509, 511 (5th Cir. 1958)). The court can, however, provide habeas corpus
relief based on the merits in a case in which the record is "totally devoid" of evidence of
the defendant's guilt. See generally Thompson v. City of Louisville, 362 U.S. 199 (1960).
62. Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Pris-
oners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441, 487 (1963).
63. Kaplan, 101 F. Supp. at 12.
64. Ex parte Binder, 660 S.W.2d at 106.
65. Id.
66. Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 317 (1963).
67. Howell, 172 F.2d at 216; see also Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 869 (holding that "in state
criminal proceedings the trial is the paramount event for determining the guilt or inno-
cence of the defendant").
68. Kaplan, 101 F. Supp. at 13.
69. TEX. R. App. P. 30(b)(6).




In 1946, the United States Supreme Court approved and adopted this
standard,72 as articulated by the Georgia Supreme Court. 73 As the facts
of the Graham case show,74 Graham did not meet the qualifications for
the granting of a new trial. Graham could have brought out the evidence
at the trial and the evidence was not so material that it probably would
have produced a different result. Graham proffered an alibi supported
only by two of Graham's cousins and a woman now married to Graham.
75
Graham could not reasonably claim that this evidence came to his knowl-
edge after the trial.
Even if Graham did meet the substantive qualifications for a new trial
based on discovery of new evidence, there is also a time limit for filing
such motions.76 Under Texas law, motions for new trial must be filed
within thirty days of sentencing, 77 in part because of the strong policy
against re-trying cases several years after the first trial.78 Consequently,
even if Graham could meet the new evidence requirements, his motion
would not be considered due to its untimeliness. Graham was originally
convicted in 1981, five years before the witnesses brought forth the "new
evidence."'79 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has examined the history
of motions for new trial and the current federal and state rules, and has
determined that the availability of a new trial several years after convic-
tion is not a part of fundamental fairness, and thus, not required by due
process.80
IV. THE SUPREME COURT'S VIEW: HERRERA V. COLLINS
The Supreme Court heard Herrera V. Collins8' as a case of first impres-
sion. For the first time, the Court addressed the question of whether or
not, in the absence of a constitutional violation, a defendant's claim of
actual innocence could serve as grounds for federal habeas corpus or
some other form of judicial remedy.82 The Court held that the above
described procedures, already in place, satisfied the defendant's due pro-
cess rights.83 The Court went on to state that the judicial system is not
71. Berry v. Georgia, 10 Ga. 511, 527 (1851).
72. United States v. Johnson, 327 U.S. 106, 110 n.4 (1946).
73. Berry, 10 Ga. at 527.
74. See infra notes 101-04 and accompanying text.
75. Gregory Curtis, Graham-standing, TEX. MONTHLY, Oct. 1993, at 9-12.
76. Beathard v. State, 767 S.W.2d 423, 433 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989).
77. TEX. R. App. P. 31(a)(1).
78. Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 380 (1990). Unfortunately, as pointed out by
the dissent in Herrera, evidence of innocence may not be discovered until long after the
trial and conviction. Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853, 878 n.4 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
79. Ex parte Graham, 853 S.W.2d 565, 566 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).
80. Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 866.
81. 113 S. Ct. 853 (1993).
82. Joseph L. Hoffman, Is Innocence Sufficient? An Essay on the U.S. Supreme
Court's Continuing Problems with Federal Habeas Corpus and the Death Penalty, 68 IND.
L.J. 817, 817 (1993).
83. Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 860.
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required to take "every conceivable step" to ensure the guilt of the de-
fendant before execution.84
A. FACTS OF CASE
The facts of Herrera's case are similar to those of Gary Graham. The
body of a Texas Department of Public Safety Officer, David Rucker, was
found on the highway near Los Fresnos, Texas, in September 1981. Of-
ficer Rucker had been shot in the head and left by the side of his patrol
car. Another officer, Enrique Carrisalez (accompanied by Enrique Her-
nandez) was in the area and noticed a speeding vehicle traveling away
from the area where Rucker lay dead. Officer Carrisalez turned on his
lights and pulled the car over, pulling up beside the vehicle. As Car-
risalez walked toward the car, the driver opened his door and, after ex-
changing a few words with the officer, shot the officer in the chest.
Carrisalez died nine days later, but not before identifying Herrera as his
assailant. Hernandez, the passenger in the patrol car, also identified
Herrera.
Police arrested Leonel Torres Herrera and charged him with the capital
murders of Rucker and Carrisalez. At the trial for the murder of officer
Carrisalez, the prosecution presented eye-witness identifications by Car-
risalez and Hernandez. The prosecution also proffered evidence that the
car involved in the Carrisalez shooting was registered to Herrera's live-in
girlfriend; that Herrera had the keys to the car in his pocket at the time of
arrest; that Herrera's Social Security card was found beside Rucker's pa-
trol car on the night of the shootings; and that type A blood samples (the
same type as Officer Rucker) and strands of Rucker's hair were found in
the car, on Herrera's jeans, and in his wallet. In addition, the prosecution
offered a hand-written letter that strongly implied Herrera's guilt, which
was found on his person at the time of his arrest.
B. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In January 1982, a jury found Herrera guilty of the capital murder of
Officer Carrisalez and sentenced him to death.85 Herrera appealed on
the grounds that the eye-witness identifications by Hernandez and Car-
risalez were unreliable and should not have been admitted. The Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Herrera's conviction,86 and the
Supreme Court denied certiorari. 87
Herrera then began to go through the collateral appeals process, still
challenging the eye-witness identifications. The State denied his applica-
tion for state habeas corpus relief. The federal courts also denied his
habeas corpus petition, and the Supreme Court denied certiorari.
84. Id.
85. Later, in July 1982, Herrera pled guilty to the capital murder of Officer Rucker.
86. Herrera v. State, 682 S.W.2d 313 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S.
1131 (1985).
87. Herrera v. Texas, 471 U.S. 1131 (1985).
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Herrera then returned to the state courts and filed a second state
habeas corpus petition, arguing that he was "actually innocent" and had
newly discovered evidence. Herrera presented two affidavits in support
of his innocence; one from Hector Villarreal, an attorney of Herrera's
brother, Raul Herrera, Sr., and one from Juan Franco Palacious, a former
cellmate of Raul Herrera, Sr. Both men claimed that Raul Herrera, Sr.,
who died in 1984, confessed to them that he had killed both Carrisalez
and Rucker. The district court denied this petition also. The Texas Court
of Criminal Appeals affirmed and the United States Supreme Court again
denied certiorari.
In February 1992, Herrera filed his second habeas petition in federal
court, again arguing that he was "actually innocent" and that his execu-
tion would therefore violate the Eighth Amendment ban on cruel and
unusual punishment 88 and the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of due
process. In support of this claim, Herrera offered the above-mentioned
affidavits and additional affidavits from Raul Herrera, Jr. (Raul Herrera,
Sr.'s son) and Jose Ybarra, Jr. Raul Jr., who was nine years old at the
time of the shootings, claimed that he witnessed his father shoot both
officers and that Herrera was not present at either time. Ybarra, a family
friend of the Herreras, stated that Raul Sr. confessed to him in 1983 that
he had shot the two officers.
The district court granted a stay of execution so that Herrera could
present his claim of actual innocence to the state court. The court of
appeals then vacated the stay on the ground that a claim of actual inno-
cence, even when supported by newly discovered evidence, is not appro-
priate grounds for federal habeas corpus relief.89 The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari and the Texas Court of Criminal Ap-
peals stayed Herrera's execution pending resolution of the case.
C. HERRERA'S ARGUMENT
Herrera argued that the newly presented evidence was sufficient to
show his innocence and should therefore entitle him to habeas corpus
relief. He maintained that the execution of an innocent person would
violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and, because there was
no available post-conviction procedure for raising a claim of actual inno-
cence, federal courts were required to provide habeas review. Herrera
stressed that he had no existing avenue available to pursue these claims
because he had missed the deadline for a motion for new trial90 and dis-
covery of new evidence is not grounds for state habeas corpus relief.91
Herrera argued that due process consequently demands that the federal
88. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; see also TEX. CONST. art. I, § 13. The Court dismissed
Herrera's Eighth Amendment claim because he was objecting to the determination of
guilt, not to the method of punishment. Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 863. The dissent, however,
did not find this a valid distinction. Id. at 877 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
89. Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 859; see also supra notes 52-68 and accompanying text.
90. See supra notes 76-80 and accompanying text.
91. See supra notes 52-68 and accompanying text.
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courts step in to guard a defendant's constitutional rights,92 especially in a
capital case. 93
D. COURT'S HOLDING
Herrera's motion was denied, but the Supreme Court fell short of an-
swering the most controversial issue in the case; whether or not the Con-
stitution requires habeas relief where a defendant has made a "truly
persuasive demonstration" of his innocence. 94 The Court reached its de-
cision by assuming, for the sake of argument, that such a showing would
entitle the defendant to federal relief if there were no available state rem-
edy, but held that Herrera had failed to make this threshold showing.95
The Court did not define this threshold, merely stating that it would be
"extraordinarily high" 96 and that Herrera's affidavits and contradicting
trial testimony, especially coming ten years after the defendant's convic-
tion, "fall[ ] far short of that which would have to be made in order to
trigger the sort of constitutional claim which we have assumed, arguendo,
to exist."' 97 With this, the Court suggested that the Constitution might
require some form of substantive federal review of the defendant's inno-
cence given different facts.98 The opinion has left the states "uncertain of
their constitutional obligations." 99
92. See Hawk v. Olson, 326 U.S. 271, 276 (1945) (citing White v. Ragen, 324 U.S. 760,
764 (1945)).
93. See California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 998-99 (1983) (recognizing that there is a
qualitative difference between the death penalty and all other forms of punishment, and
that this difference demands a correspondingly greater degree of federal scrutiny); see also
Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 411 (1986); Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357-58
(1977).
94. Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 869. The Court held that resolving the issue of whether a
truly persuasive showing of innocence would entitle the defendant to habeas corpus relief
was "neither necessary nor advisable in this case." Id. at 871.
95. Id. Justice Scalia, however, would not agree that such a right exists and claimed
that the dissent, in arguing such a right does exist, relied on "nothing but their personal
opinions to invalidate the rules of more than two thirds of the States, and a Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure." Id. at 875 (Scalia, J., concurring).
96. Id. at 869.
97. Id. at 870 (italics omitted). The Court found Herrera's new evidence unconvincing
for several reasons. First, the affidavits were obtained without cross-examination or evi-
dence of demeanor and credibility. Second, all the affidavits, except that of Raul Herrera,
Jr., contained only hearsay. Third, Herrera provided the Court with no satisfactory expla-
nation as to why the evidence was not presented at trial, but rather, after the alleged perpe-
trator of the murder was dead. Id. at 869. The Court also wrote that Herrera's claim for
relief must be looked at "in the light of the previous proceedings.., which have stretched
over a span of 10 years." Id. at 859.
98. Hoffman, supra note 82, at 833. In fact, Justice O'Connor suggested that if the
state constitutional procedures and the executive pardon and clemency procedures work as
they should, the question may never have to be resolved. Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 874
(O'Connor, J., concurring).




V. EX PARTE GRAHAM 1° ° - ROUND ONE
Gary Graham's case again brought to the forefront the question of
what due process requires when a defendant makes a claim of "actual
innocence" after he has exhausted the existing collateral appeals system.
The facts of Graham's case are very similar to those that confronted the
Supreme Court in Herrera.'0' On May 17, 1981, a 53-year-old man
stopped at a grocery store in north Houston. He picked up a few items
and paid with a $100 bill. A young black man, later identified as Graham,
followed him out of the store and attempted to rob him. Unfortunately,
the assailant shot and killed Bobby Lambert in the struggle that followed.
A jury convicted Gary Graham of the murder and sentenced him to
death. Although Graham plead guilty to ten similar robberies, including
two in which the victims were shot, he maintained that he was innocent of
the crime for which he was sentenced to death. To support this claim,
three alibi witnesses (two cousins and Graham's present wife) came for-
ward to testify that Graham was with them on the night of the murder.
These witnesses did not testify in the 1981 trial and made no attempt to
come forward until 1986, when they gave "confused and contradictory
testimony" to a district court judge who found them not to be credible.' 0 2
Graham has exhausted the judicial process in his case, 10 3 yet he at-
tempted to obtain a post-conviction hearing to consider his claims of ac-
tual innocence in light of the new evidence. 104 The Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals refused to consider Graham's claims of actual inno-
cence in the habeas corpus setting.1°5 The concurrences, however, ex-
pressed serious doubt as to the constitutional validity of that ruling
because of the undefined threshold standard articulated in Herrera v.
Collins.1°6 Judge Maloney of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals pro-
posed that the standard should be "whether the newly discovered evi-
dence, if true, would create a doubt as to the efficacy of the verdict to the
extent that it undermines our confidence in the verdict and that it is prob-
able that the verdict would be different.' 0 7 Maloney also suggested
that, for several reasons, Graham had succeeded in meeting the standard
that Herrera was unable to meet. 108 First, the affidavits in Graham's case
attested to Graham's whereabouts on the night of the murder. Unlike
the affidavits in Herrera's case, they do not rely on hearsay. 109 Second,
Judge Maloney claimed that the affidavits in Graham's case were not in-
100. 853 S.W.2d 565 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).
101. See supra sections IV.A., B.
102. Gregory Curtis, Graham-standing, TEX. MONTHLY, Oct. 1993, at 9-12.
103. State ex rel. Holmes v. Third Court of Appeals, 860 S.W.2d 873 (Tex. Crim. App.
1993).
104. Id.
105. Ex parte Graham, 853 S.W.2d at 566.
106. Supra note 98 and accompanying text.
107. Ex pare Graham, 853 S.W.2d at 567 (Maloney, J., concurring and dissenting).




consistent with each other.110 Third, Maloney asserted that, unlike Her-
rera, Graham had a legitimate excuse for not presenting these witnesses
at trial; his attorney did not contact them.111 Fourth, in addition to the
affidavits attesting to Graham's alibi, also presented were several eye wit-
nesses to the crime who were prepared to testify that Graham was not the
assailant." 2 Fifth, unlike in Herrera's case, there was no physical evi-
dence linking Graham to the crime scene, such that the alibi evidence
would carry more weight." 3 Finally, Graham neither confessed to this
crime nor made any incriminating statements." 4 Maloney, in her concur-
rence and dissent, maintained that the strength of this evidence, taken
together and examined in light of the State's evidence at trial, met the
requisite threshold that Herrera failed to meet. Consequently, Maloney
argued that Graham should be granted a hearing to determine the credi-
bility of this new evidence and possibly granted a new trial. 115 The ma-
jority, however, did not agree that Graham met the threshold and denied
relief on the question of actual innocence. 16
VI. GRAHAM V. TEXAS BOARD OF PARDONS AND
PAROLES" 7 - ROUND TWO
A. Is THE CLEMENCY SYSTEM ADEQUATE?
Much of the courts' previous willingness to cut off habeas corpus re-
view as an avenue for introducing allegedly exonerating evidence has
been based on the availability of the clemency system as a "fail safe."
The clemency system occupies an important position in our criminal jus-
tice system." 8 When there is actually a substantial doubt as to a defend-
ant's guilt, but the appellate and collateral proceedings do not supply
relief, society is able to rely on the "extrajudicial remedy of clemency [to]
ensure that the offender is not punished unfairly."" 9 Executive clemency
has always been the traditional avenue for relief in cases where evidence
of innocence is discovered too late to file a motion for new trial.120 Gra-
110. Id.
111. Id. The legitimacy of this excuse, however, is questionable considering the fact
that the Court of Criminal Appeals refused to grant relief on the ground of ineffective
assistance of counsel. Ex parte Graham, 853 S.W.2d at 565.




116. Id. at 566. The Court did stay Graham's execution pending the outcome of John-
son v. Texas, which was at the United States Supreme Court on the issue of whether or not
the jury instructions allowed the jury to adequately consider Johnson's youth as a mitigat-
ing factor in sentencing. Johnson v. Texas, 113 S. Ct. 2658, 2669 (1993).
117. Cited and discussed in State ex rel. Holmes v. Third Court of Appeals, 860 S.W.2d
873 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).
118. Daniel T. Kobil, The Quality of Mercy Strained: Wrestling the Pardoning Power
from the King, 69 TEx. L. REV. 569, 639 (1991).
119. Id. at 625.
120. Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853, 869 (1993).
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ham, however, has also claimed that the current clemency procedures vio-
late due process.
On July 21, 1993, Graham filed a petition for declaratory, injunctive,
and mandamus relief on the grounds that the Texas Board of Pardons and
Paroles violated his due process rights by denying him a "full-blown, trial-
like hearing on his application for executive clemency.' 121 The district
court temporarily enjoined Graham's execution until the Board granted
the requested hearing. The Board, however, did not hold the requested
hearing and Graham's execution was not rescheduled. Instead, the
Board filed for appeal, which automatically suspended the court-imposed
injunction. On August 13, 1993, pursuant to a motion by Graham, the
court of appeals issued another injunction preventing Graham's execu-
tion until final disposition of the appeal so that Texas courts could con-
front the issue of whether the due process clause requires the executive to
provide a prisoner with a due course of law hearing before denying
clemency.
B. HISTORY OF CLEMENCY
The practice of executive clemency relief is derived from the English
common-law, 122 and is now available in all fifty states and in every nation
with the exception of China.123 In the United States, the President has
the power under the Constitution to grant reprieves and pardons.124 The
governor in each state also has clemency power.125 Under the clemency
system, the executive can either pardon the defendant-that is, declare
him innocent, release him from prison, and clear his record-or commute
the death sentence to a lesser sentence. 126 Clemency is a more appropri-
ate remedy for claims of actual innocence than additional judicial proce-
dures for several reasons. 127 "Clemency has long been considered an
extraordinary remedy that can be extended for virtually any rea-
son .... "128 Clemency is appropriate in these types of cases because the
clemency system allows the executive to take into account extraordinary
circumstances in individual cases and is an avenue relatively free of tech-
nical restrictions. 29
121. Graham v. Texas Bd. of Pardons and Paroles (cited and discussed in State ex. rel
Holmes v. Third Court of Appeals, 860 S.W.2d 873, 879 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (Campbell,
J., dissenting)).
122. Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256, 262 (1974).
123. Kobil, supra note 118, at 575.
124. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. "The President ... shall have Power to grant Re-
prieves and Pardons for offences against the United States, except in Cases of Impeach-
ment." Id.
125. See, e.g., 37 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 143 (West 1994). The power of governors to
grant reprieves is a state power, not one granted or controlled by the Federal Constitution.
Rogers v. Peck, 199 U.S. 425, 435 (1905) (citing Lambert v. Barrett, 159 U.S. 660, 663
(1895)).
126. Kobil, supra note 118, at 576-77.
127. Bator, supra note 62, at 525-26.
128. Kobil, supra note 118, at 578.
129. Bator, supra note 62, at 525-26.
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Courts have long recognized the value of this extrajudicial remedy. In
a case similar to both Herrera and Graham, the defendant sought to in-
troduce newly discovered evidence in a collateral appeal and the court
held that Texas law provided the defendant with no judicial remedy. 130
Similarly, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals refused to grant another
criminal defendant habeas corpus relief based on newly discovered evi-
dence, but rather, suggested that the defendant "pursue any remedies the
state executive branch ha[d] to offer.' 131
C. PROBLEMS WITH THE CLEMENCY SYSTEM
Critics of the clemency system suggest, however, that for several rea-
sons, the system is not an adequate safeguard of offenders' constitutional
rights. First, some argue that because the clemency system lacks the con-
trol of formalized procedures, it cannot be an adequate relief mecha-
nism.132 Commentator Paul Bator, for example, argues that federal
habeas corpus proceedings were designed specifically to be a federal rem-
edy for an inadequate state pardons system.133 Justice Blackmun wrote
in Herrera that "one thing is certain: The possibility of executive clem-
ency is not sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the . . . Fourteenth
Amendment[ ].,,134
Second, the effectiveness and reliability of executive clemency can be
diminished, in practice, by political pressures and other factors.135 Gov-
ernors have been removed from office or have had their political careers
cut short because of their use of clemency power in unpopular cases. 136
A third argument against relying on clemency as a fail-safe remedy is
that, by definition, clemency is an "act of grace," and the vindication of a
constitutional right should not be made to turn on an act of grace or on
the unreviewable whim of the executive. 137 The Supreme Court held
long ago that a legal right ceases to have meaning if the laws furnish no
remedy when that right is violated.138
D. GRAHAM'S CLAIM
Graham claims that, for these and other reasons, the current clemency
process is not an adequate procedural vehicle for actual innocence claims.
He points to the inadequacy of Texas procedures specifically. The Texas
130. Shaver v. Ellis, 255 F.2d 509, 511 (5th Cir. 1958).
131. Ex parte Binder, 660 S.W.2d 103, 106 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983).
132. Ex parte Graham, 853 S.W.2d 565, 568 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (Maloney, J., con-
curring and dissenting). "The very purpose of a Bill of Rights [is] to withdraw certain
subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of
majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the
courts." Id. (quoting West Virginia St. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943)).
133. Bator, supra note 62, at 526.
134. Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853, 881 (1993) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
135. Kobil, supra note 118, at 607-09.
136. Id. at 607.
137. Ex parte Graham, 853 S.W.2d at 568 (Maloney, J., concurring and dissenting).
138. Id. (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803)).
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Constitution authorizes the governor to grant clemency and pardons. 139
The Texas Administrative Code provides further guidance as to the pro-
cedures involved in obtaining a grant of clemency or pardon based on
actual innocence. Section 143.2 provides that the Board will only con-
sider applications for clemency based on innocence of the offense if pro-
vided with:
(1) a written unanimous recommendation of the current trial officials
of the court of conviction; and/or (2) a certified order or judgment of
a court having jurisdiction accompanied by certified copy of the find-
ings of fact (if any); and (3) affidavits of witnesses upon which the
finding of innocence is based.' 40
Section 143.6 further provides that while an inmate is in prison, a pardon
will not be considered unless "exceptional circumstances exist.' 141 Gra-
ham argues that the language of the statute implies the need for a hearing
on the offender's innocence claim in which the prisoner could provide the
required documents. 42 The Third Court of Appeals enjoined Graham's
execution pending resolution of the appeal. 43
The United States Supreme Court has refused to hold that a defendant
has any "right" to executive clemency. The Court held in Connecticut
Board of Pardons v. Dumschat144 that "the mere existence of a power to
commute a lawfully imposed sentence, and the granting of commutations
to many petitioners, create no right or 'entitlement.' A state cannot be
required to explain its reasons for a decision when [the state] is not re-
quired to act on prescribed grounds.' 45 In that case, the prisoner, Dum-
schat, was convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. The
Connecticut Board of Pardons has the power to commute life sentences
and thereby accelerate the date at which the prisoner will be eligible for
parole. 146 The Board gives favorable treatment to approximately sev-
enty-five percent of prisoners with life sentences. The Board rejected
Dumschat's repeated applications for a commutation without explana-
tion. Dumschat then filed suit against the Board under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
claiming that the Board violated his due process rights by denying his
139. TEX. CONST. art. IV, § 11(b).
140. 37 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 143.2 (West 1994).
141. Id. § 143.6.
142. Justice White disagreed, arguing that a court's denial of a habeas corpus petition
based on actual innocence would qualify as an order of a court having jurisdiction. See
State ex rel. Holmes, 1994 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 52, at *37; 37 TEX. ADMIN. CODE
§ 143.2(2) (West 1994).
143. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, however, vacated that injunction, holding
that the civil court had no jurisdiction to stay a scheduled execution and circumvent the
decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals. State ex rel. Holmes, 1994 Tex. Crim. App.
LEXIS 52, at *20.
144. 452 U.S. 458 (1981).
145. Id. at 467.
146. Dumschat was convicted in 1964 and would have become eligible for parole in
December 1983. An inmate with a life sentence in Connecticut must serve at least 25
years, less a maximum of 5 years' good-time credits, unless the Board of Pardons com-
mutes the sentence. Id. at 460 n.1 (citing CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-125 (1981)).
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applications without providing him with a written statement detailing the
reasons for the denial.
The district court held "(a) that Dumschat had a constitutionally pro-
tected liberty entitlement in the pardon process, and (b) that his due pro-
cess rights had been violated when the Board of Pardons failed to give 'a
written statement of reasons and facts relied on' in denying commuta-
tion.' 1 47 Moreover, the court held that all state prisoners with life
sentences have the "constitutionally protected expectancy of commuta-
tion and therefore that they have a right to a statement of reasons when
commutation is not granted. 1 48 The court of appeals affirmed 149 and
held that a brief statement of reasons for a denial is "not only constitu-
tionally sufficient but also constitutionally necessary."' 50 The Supreme
Court reversed on the grounds that Dumschat had no entitlement to the
pardon, and therefore, the state was not required to explain its reasons
for denial.' 5 ' The Court held that, given the fact that there was no under-
lying right to a pardon, the due process protection was never triggered. 52
The Court supported this proposition by quoting a previous Supreme
Court decision:
There is no constitutional or inherent right of a convicted person to
be conditionally released before the expiration of a valid sentence.
The natural desire of an individual to be released is indistinguishable
from the initial resistance to being confined. But the conviction, with
all its procedural safeguards, has extinguished that liberty right
153
The fact that the Board has been generous in commuting life sentences
does not convert the expectation of commutation from a mere hope into
a constitutionally protected right.154
Relying on this reasoning, the Texas Supreme Court should deny Gary
Graham's petition for a judicially imposed hearing on his clemency appli-
cation. If prisoners such as Graham do not have a constitutionally pro-
tected interest in executive leniency, then they are not entitled to due
process with regard to that leniency. The decisionmaker is given discre-
147. Id. at 461 (citing Connecticut Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 432 F. Supp. 1310, 1315
(D. Conn. 1977)).
148. Id. at 462.
149. Dumschat v. Board of Pardons, 593 F.2d 165, 166 (2d Cir. 1979). The Supreme
Court remanded the case back to the court for reconsideration in light of the Supreme
Court's decision in Greenholtz v, Inmates of the Nebraska Penal and Correctional Com-
plex, 442 U.S. 1 (1979). The court of appeals affirmed its previous decision and stated that
Connecticut's pardon system "offers only the 'mere hope' of pardon; it does not create a
legitimate expectation of freedom and therefore does not implicate due process," but went
on to hold that "[t]he overwhelming likelihood that Connecticut life inmates will be
pardoned and released before they complete their minimum terms gives them a constitu-
tionally protected liberty interest in pardon proceedings." Dumschat, 452 U.S. at 462-63
(quoting Dumschat v. Board of Pardons, 618 F.2d 216, 219-20 (2d Cir. 1980)).
150. Dumschat, 452 U.S. at 462 (quoting 618 F.2d at 222).
151. Id. at 467.
152. Id. at 464.




tion to deny the relief "for any constitutionally permissible reason or for
no reason at all."'1 55
VII. STATE EX REL. HOLMES V. HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE THIRD DISTRICT1 56 - ROUND
THREE
The Texas Court of Appeals has not yet ruled on Graham's request for
a hearing on his clemency application. The court did, however, grant an
injunction precluding the state from executing Graham pending the out-
come of the appeal. John Holmes, the Harris County District Attorney,
and the Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles consequently sought a writ
of mandamus from the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals ordering the
civil court of appeals to withdraw its injunction on the grounds that the
civil court had no jurisdiction to circumvent decisions of the court of
criminal appeals. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals agreed and va-
cated the injunction. 157 The court went on, in a purely advisory fash-
ion, 158 to overrule Ex parte Binder159 and declare habeas corpus an
appropriate avenue to assert a claim of actual innocence. 160 The court
then adopted the standard proposed by Judge Maloney in her dissent in
Ex parte Graham,161 holding that if a prisoner can show that the new
evidence, if true, would "create a doubt as to the efficacy of the verdict to
the extent that it undermines our confidence in the verdict and that it is
probable that the verdict would be different," the prisoner must be af-
forded an opportunity to present that evidence to the habeas court. 162
Once the prisoner meets this standard, he has the burden to prove that
"based on proffered newly discovered evidence and the entire record
before the jury that convicted him, no rational trier of fact could find
proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt."'1 63
155. Id. at 467 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citing Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 228
(1976)).
156. No. 71,764, 1994 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 52 (Tex. Crim. App. Apr. 20, 1994).
157. State ex rel. Holmes, Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 52, at *19-22. The majority wrote:
If it be the law in Texas that every district judge must be satisfied before a
death sentence may be carried out, and any district judge may prevent the
execution of such a sentence upon grounds which this Court has rejected,
then this Court is not a court of last resort in criminal matters in this state.
Id. at *19-20 (citing Wilson v. Briggs, 351 S.W.2d 892, 896 (Tex. Crim. App. 1961)).
158. Id. at *95 (Clinton, J., dissenting). The majority's dicta concerning claims of actual
innocence is "wholly unnecessary to disposition of the applications for writ of mandamus
and prohibition. In this respect, the majority opinion is baldly, unabashedly advisory." Id.
159. 660 S.W.2d 103 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983); see supra notes 61-64 and accompanying
text.
160. State ex rel. Holmes, 1994 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 52, at *24-25.
161. See supra notes 107-16 and accompanying text.
162. State ex rel. Holmes, 1994 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 52, at *29-30.
163. Id. at *32 (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 324 (1979) (internal quotations
omitted)). Judge Clinton, however, argued that, by choosing this impossibly high standard,
the majority had negated their attempts to provide death row inmates an avenue for relief.
"This is so because any evidence sufficient to support a jury's verdict beyond a reasonable
doubt at trial will also be sufficient to support a rational jury's guilty verdict even after
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This opinion of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals is way off the
mark. Allowing this new ground for habeas review opens the flood gates
and gives every convicted felon the opportunity to relitigate his
innocence. 164
VIII. ACTUAL INNOCENCE - THE FINAL ROUND?
It is hard to predict where the courts will go after the latest decision
from the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. A defendant's claim of "ac-
tual innocence" seems to throw courts into a tailspin, but they must be
sure to balance the defendant's right to have new evidence admitted
against the public's interests in the integrity of the adversary process and
in the fair and efficient administration of justice.165
A. ACTUAL INNOCENCE AS A GATEWAY
Exactly where this balance will be drawn is unclear. The courts seem
to be moving more and more toward a substantive, rather than a proce-
dural view of due process, and it seems likely that habeas relief in the
future will become contingent, to a greater extent, on the merits of a pris-
oner's case. 166 Even before Texas hinted that a claim of innocence may
be an independent ground for habeas corpus relief, the courts had taken
the position that some of the procedural restrictions on habeas relief
could be avoided if the prisoner could provide evidence of "actual inno-
cence," thereby making the claim a "gateway" through which a petitioner
could have his constitutional claims heard.167
The United States Supreme Court dealt with this issue in McCleskey v.
Zant.168 Warren McCleskey was convicted and sentenced to death in
1978 for the murder of an off-duty policeman who entered a Georgia fur-
niture store in the middle of an armed robbery. McCleskey then spent
the next ten years attacking his conviction with both direct and collateral
appeals. The Supreme Court, in 1991, denied McCleskey's most recent
application for federal habeas corpus relief on the grounds of abuse of
writ.16
9
The Court held, however, that if the petitioner could show that denial
of his petition would result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice, he
might be excused from the penalties of abuse of writ. 170 This "miscar-
adding the most compelling newly discovered evidence to the mix." Id. at *98 (Clinton, J.,
dissenting).
164. Id. at *48 (White, J., concurring and dissenting). Judge White wrote: "[I]t is
neither necessary, nor very wise, to open up the state habeas system for such claims." Id.
165. Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 414-15 (1988).
166. Hoffman, supra note 82, at 820.
167. Id. at 819; Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853, 862 (1993); see also Murray v. Carrier,
477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986).
168. 499 U.S. 467 (1991).
169. Id. Pursuant to the doctrine of abuse of writ, federal courts can decline to consider
a claim when it is presented for the first time in the petitioner's second or subsequent
petition. Id. at 489.
170. Id. at 495.
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riage of justice exception" provides an additional safeguard against exe-
cuting a prisoner who is actually innocent, because if the petitioner can
supplement his habeas petition with a "colorable showing of factual inno-
cence," the federal courts will be required to entertain that petition and
evaluate the petitioner's constitutional claims notwithstanding the abuse
of writ doctrine. 17 1
B. FUTURE OF SUBSTANTIVE REVIEW
The judiciary seems to be attempting to erect a system of "perfect
death-penalty procedures that can guarantee a perfect result."'1 72 This
goal is unrealistic. The costs of providing additional review of the merits
of a defendant's case must be weighed against the risk that our present
procedures will reach an erroneous result in order to determine whether
the additional procedures are necessary.
1. Risks
Obviously, our criminal justice system should not allow an innocent
person to be executed when he can prove his innocence. For that reason,
and because of the special nature of the death penalty, the Constitution
requires a "heightened standard of reliability" in capital cases. 173 The
processes by which the states convict individuals are reliable and provide
many safeguards to prevent an innocent person from being convicted. 174
Society should be able to depend on the states to regulate these safe-
guards because they have an interest in accurate trial verdicts.175 This
interest includes avoiding the public outrage that would accompany an
inaccurate conviction, supporting a prisoner who should not be incarcer-
ated, and protecting society from the dangers of erroneously released
prisoners. 176
These interests are magnified in the case of a defendant accused of a
capital crime. 177 The states, therefore, have typically provided additional
safeguards for capital cases. First, the option of sentencing a defendant to
171. Id.
172. Hoffman, supra note 82, at 818.
173. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 411 (1986) (requiring a "high regard for truth
that befits a decision affecting the life or death of a human being").
174. Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 19 (1989); see, e.g., Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 859-60
(citing Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012 (1988) (right to confront adverse witnesses)); Taylor v.
Illinois, 484 U.S. 400 (1988) (right to compulsory process); Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668 (1984) (right to effective assistance of counsel); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970)
(prosecution must prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S.
145 (1968) (right to jury trial); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (prosecution must
disclose exculpatory evidence); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to assist-
ance of counsel); In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955) (right to "fair trial in a fair
tribunal").
175. Anne W. Reed, Guilt, Innocence, and Federalism in Habeas Corpus, 65 CORNELL
L. REV. 1123, 1142-43 (1980).
176. Id.
177. Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 860.
1994]
SMU LAW REVIEW
death is reserved for a limited number of crimes.178 Second, the state
must give advance notice to the defendant of its intention to ask for the
death penalty and the aggravating circumstances that it seeks to prove. 179
Third, the sentence is decided in a post-verdict penalty phase in front of a
jury and the defendant is represented by counsel during that proceed-
ing. 180 Fourth, aggravating factors must be proven by the state beyond a
reasonable doubt.' 8 ' Fifth, consideration is given to mitigating factors.182
Finally, the sentence must be imposed by a unanimous decision of the
jury.183
In addition, the system of both direct and collateral review makes it
even more unlikely that an innocent defendant will actually be put to
death. 84 The states provide for automatic state supreme court review of
capital convictions. 185 The states also give a defendant the opportunity to
pursue avenues of collateral review such as habeas corpus. 186 Finally, a
defendant may appeal to the executive for clemency. 187 Amazingly, even
given the extensive procedural safeguards afforded to a criminal defend-
ant in a capital trial and direct review, some critics have suggested that we
obviously have little confidence in that system if we are willing to allow
such an expenditure of resources for collateral appeal. 88
A 1987 study conducted by Hugo Bedau and Michael Radelet suggests
that, in fact, 350 defendants have been convicted of capital or potentially
capital crimes and later found to be innocent. 189 The authors claim that
this number includes only defendants who were "factually innocent" and
excludes those that should have been let off on some technical ground,
but in fact committed the crime.190 The authors blame these erroneous
convictions on four types of error: police error prior to trial; prosecution
error before or during the trial; witness error; and miscellaneous error.' 9 '
For several reasons, this study can be misleading if the reader is not
aware of the classes of defendants included in the 350 total. That number
includes many cases in which the death penalty either could not have
been, or was not imposed. The authors included defendants who were
convicted of a non-capital form of a crime (such as murder), 192 defend-
178. Stephen J. Markman & Paul G. Cassell, Protecting the Innocent: A Response to the
Bedau-Radelet Study, 41 STAN. L. REV. 121, 147 (1988).
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 147-48.
182. Id. at 148.
183. Id.
184. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 420 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring).
185. Markman & Cassell, supra note 178, at 148.
186. Id. at 148-50.
187. Id. at 148.
188. Friendly, supra note 17, at 145.
189. Hugo A. Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, Miscarriages of Justice in Potentially Capital
Cases, 40 STAN. L. REV. 21, 23-24 (1987).
190. Id. at 45-46.
191. Id. at 56. The authors of the study did not specify what types of offenses they
grouped in the "miscellaneous" category.
192. Id. at 32.
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ants who were convicted of a capital crime but given a sentence other
than the death penalty,193 and defendants who were convicted in states
that either did not authorize the death penalty, or did not permit the
death penalty for that particular crime. x94 Only twenty-three of the cases
cited ended in execution of the accused. 195 Critics of the study argue that
by expanding the study group to encompass "potentially capital crimes,"
the authors have greatly overstated the threat of executing an innocent
person, given that only 6.6% of the study group is even relevant to the
issue of wrongful execution. 196
Moreover, only four of these executions have taken place since 1943,197
and only one since the advent of the procedural safeguards articulated
after Furman v. Georgia in 1972.198 Stephen Markman and Paul Cassell,
critics of the Bedau-Radelet study, wrote that contrary to the authors'
intentions, the study actually confirms the fact that the risk of executing
an innocent person is too small to force a change in current sentencing
procedures.199
In addition to the enlarged group of defendants included in the study,
Markman and Cassell question Bedau and Radelet's use of the phrase
"found to be innocent," because Bedau and Radelet do not provide much
authority for their findings of "innocence" other than their own personal
evaluation of the record.200 Ultimately, Markman and Cassell conclude
that absolutely no persuasive evidence exists that an innocent person has
been executed in over twenty-five years.201 Even if this conclusion is
wrong, however, that does not mean that our procedural system is faulty.
As the Supreme Court recently pointed out, "[c]ourts do make mis-
takes. '202 No system of justice can guarantee that any decision will ulti-
mately be "correct. '20 3 While society should, of course, strive to have a
fair and efficient judicial system, criminal procedure should not cater to
the irrational fear that somewhere, some error might be made.204
193. Id. at 31-32.
194. Bedau & Rachelet, supra note 189, at 33.
195. Id. at 36.
196. Markman & Cassell, supra note 178, at 124.
197. Bedau & Radelet, supra note 189, at 72. This accounts for only 0.22% of the ex-
ecutions performed during that time period.
198. Markman & Cassell, supra note 178, at 24 (referring to Furman v. Georgia, 408
U.S. 238 (1972)). Since 1972, the Supreme Court has greatly limited jury discretion in
deciding whether or not to impose the death penalty. States are now required to "channel
the discretion" of juries so as to minimize the risk of arbitrary decisions. Johnson v. Texas,
113 S. Ct. 2658, 2664-65 (1993). Markman and Cassell compare this to "studying traffic
deaths before the adoption of traffic signals." Markman & Cassell, supra note 178, at 72.
199. Markman & Cassell, supra note 178, at 121.
200. Id. at 126-27. While Bedau and Radelet concede that they have no "proof" that
the defendants in their study are factually innocent, they abide by their conclusions and
question what would constitute adequate proof. Hugo A. Bedau & Michael L. Radelet,
The Myth of Infallibility: A Reply to Markman and Cassell, 41 STAN. L. REV. 161, 164
(1988).
201. Markman & Cassell, supra note 178, at 150.
202. Willy v. Coastal Corp., 112 S. Ct. 1076, 1081 (1992).
203. Bator, supra note 62, at 509-10.




The huge costs of additional collateral proceedings are to be weighed
against the very small risk of executing someone who is actually innocent.
These costs fall into four areas: disrespect for the finality of judgments;
problems with federalism issues; expenditure of judicial resources; and
the possibility that the process will be manipulated by defendants.20 5
a. Finality
States have an important interest in finality, and continual habeas
corpus attacks on a judgment "strike[ ] at [the] finality" of that judg-
ment.206 In the interest of order and stability, findings of fact made by
the trial court should not be disturbed unless there are "most extraordi-
nary circumstances. '207 Finality in determinations of guilt is necessary
and beneficial for several reasons. First, the deterrent effect of punish-
ment is greater if others believe that the sentence is final.20 8 Second, re-
habilitation cannot be effective until a defendant believes that judgment
is final.20 9 Commentator Henry Friendly echoes this reasoning, arguing
that "[u]nbounded willingness to entertain attacks on convictions must
interfere with at least one aim of punishment - a realization by the con-
vict that he is justly subject to sanction [and] that he stands in need of
rehabilitation. '210 Third, the passage of time, the erosion of memories,
and the dispersion of witnesses make a second fact determination less
reliable than the first.211 Moreover, the longer the delay, the less reliable
any determination of an issue giving rise to the collateral attack will be.212
These benefits of finality outweigh any illusory notion that the truth
will be found if society puts forth enough effort.213 The legal community
apparently harbors a strong, but ill-founded belief that if only the proce-
dures could be improved, the criminal justice system could achieve per-
fect results. 214
205. McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 491-92 (1991).
206. Id. at 491.
207. United States v. Johnson, 327 U.S. 106, 111 (1946).
208. Kuhlman v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 452-53 (1986).
209. Id.
210. Friendly, supra note 17, at 146 (internal quotation marks omitted).
211. Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853, 862 (1993); McCleskey, 499 U.S. at 491; Kuhl-
man, 477 U.S. at 453.
212. Friendly, supra note 17, at 147.
213. Commentator Paul Bator, while agreeing that extensive collateral review attacks
the finality of judgments, questions why finality seems so important with regard to ques-
tions of guilt and innocence and yet is almost ignored with regard to constitutional viola-
tions. This disparity seems especially odd considering that constitutional questions are in
large part technical and questions of guilt and innocence are so fundamental to achieving
justice. Bator, supra note 62, at 509.




A second cost of federal collateral review is the problem it creates con-
cerning federalism. The federal system trusts administration of the crimi-
nal justice system to the states. 215 "[P]reventing and dealing with crime is
much more the business of the States than it is of the Federal Govern-
ment. '216 Federal habeas corpus review of state criminal convictions
therefore interferes with state powers.217 Federal interference is war-
ranted only when there is an invasion of constitutionally secured, funda-
mental rights.21 8 The Supreme Court recognizes this and is not anxious
to construe the Constitution so as to interfere with the individual states'
power to administer justice.21 9 After all, the states have just as large an
interest in the accuracy of convictions as the federal government and can
be expected to generate equally accurate results.220
c. Judicial Resources
A third cost of allowing additional collateral review of judgments is the
additional burden it would place on an already over-worked judicial sys-
tem. Petitions for federal habeas corpus relief began to "overwhelm" the
federal docket in 1953 and the number of petitions has steadily increased
ever since.22' These petitions strain the judicial system not only in terms
of financial resources, but in terms of intellectual, moral, and political
resources as well.222 This added strain limits the courts' capacity to re-
solve primary disputes. 223 Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court in
Herrera, maintained that "[flew rulings would be more disruptive of our
federal system than to provide for federal habeas review of free-standing
claims of actual innocence. 224
d. Potential for Abuse by Defendants
Federal courts have traditionally disfavored new claims brought in
habeas corpus proceedings that could have, and should have, been
brought forth earlier.225 This is especially true when the claims are
brought forth only once execution is imminent.226 The present system of
collateral review is already subject to much abuse and manipulation by
215. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 168 (1952).
216. Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 638 (1991) (quoting Irvine v. California, 347 U.S.
128, 134 (1954) (plurality opinion)).
217. McCleskey, 499 U.S. at 491.
218. Rogers v. Peck, 199 U.S. 256, 260 (1905).
219. Medina v. California, 112 S. Ct. 2572, 2577 (1992).
220. Reed, supra note 175, at 1143.
221. Friendly, supra note 17, at 143-44.
222. Bator, supra note 62, at 451.
223. McCleskey, 499 U.S. at 491.
224. Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853, 861 (1993). Justice Blackmun countered, how-
ever, that if adopted, his standard of "probable innocence" would not turn the federal
courts into "forums in which to relitigate state trials." Id. at 883 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(quoting from the majority opinion).




prisoners. The Court in Herrera suggested that collateral attacks, like
new trial motions, are often abused "as a method of delaying enforce-
ment of just sentences. '227 Woodward v. Hutchins228 is one example of
this type of abuse. After exhausting his state remedies, Hutchins filed
successive applications for federal habeas corpus, raising claims that
should have been raised in his first petition. Another example is Gomez
v. United States District Court for the Northern District of California.229
In that case, the Court was confronted with a fifth writ of habeas corpus,
labeling the efforts an "obvious attempt at manipulation. '230 The pre-
sumption of abuse is strengthened when a writ is supported by a defense
witness who is not identified "until after the 11th hour has passed. '231
3. Balancing Test
When the substantial costs of allowing additional collateral review are
weighed against the small chance that, without them, the system risks ex-
ecuting an innocent individual, the advisability of the extra measures
seems questionable, especially in light of the fact that "even perfect pro-
cedures cannot guarantee perfect results. ' 232 Additionally, a second trial,
several years after the first, is not likely to produce a more reliable result
because of the decreased availability and memories of the witnesses. 233
Society is therefore faced with the possibility of incurring all the costs of
these additional procedural steps with no corresponding reduction in the
risk of executing an innocent person.
These additional post-conviction procedures are unattractive not only
because of the high cost-to-benefit ratio associated with them, but also
because other, more adequate remedies exist for a prisoner who claims to
possess new evidence of his innocence.
IX. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
Commentator Paul Bator once wrote, "if a job can be done well once,
it should not be done twice. '234 The logic of this argument is sound and
suggests that before society overhauls the system of collateral review,
time and money would be better spent making sure the job is done well in
the first instance. In fact, "[tihe high standard for newly discovered evi-
dence claims presupposes that all the essential elements of a presump-
227. Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 869 (quoting United States v. Johnson, 327 U.S. 106, 112
(1946)).
228. 464 U.S. 377 (1984).
229. 112 S. Ct. 1652 (1992).
230. Id. at 1653.
231. Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 414 (1988). Herrera presented affidavits supporting
his innocence 10 years after his conviction, but these were fraught with inconsistencies,
providing no explanation as to why certain witnesses had not come forward at the trial.
Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 869-70. The witnesses that gave affidavits in the Graham case did not
come forward until five years after Graham's conviction. Curtis, supra note 102.
232. Hoffman, supra note 82, at 825.
233. Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 862.
234. Bator, supra note 62, at 451.
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tively accurate and fair proceeding were present in the proceeding whose
result is challenged." 235
In order for society to have confidence in the criminal justice system,
indigent defendants must have quality representation.236 If the evidence
of innocence that the defendant seeks to have considered existed at the
time of trial, yet was not introduced by counsel, the defendant may obtain
direct review or habeas corpus relief on the grounds of ineffective assist-
ance of counsel. 237 Under such review, the question is whether or not
there is a "reasonable probability that, absent the errors [by counsel], the
factfinder would have had reasonable doubt respecting guilt. '2 38 If the
defendant cannot meet this relatively low standard, the evidence should
not later be examined in collateral review under the pretext of being
"newly discovered." Redress for ineffective assistance of counsel is sim-
ply a much more appropriate avenue in such a situation. "An ineffective
assistance claim asserts the absence of one of the crucial assurances that
the result of the proceeding is reliable, so finality concerns are somewhat
weaker .... "239
Texas courts have overturned convictions where the defendant's attor-
ney failed to make adequate investigations. 240 The court in Ex parte
Raborn,241 for example, vacated the defendant's conviction on the
grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel.242 Raborn's attorney did not
conduct an independent investigation of the facts in the case, but instead
relied solely on discussions with the prosecutor. The extent of counsel's
duty to conduct pretrial investigation is difficult to measure, but should
be judged in context with the information the attorney had at the time
and not by what in hindsight seems reasonable.243 Certainly, if Graham's
attorney failed to interview alibi witnesses alleged by Graham to have
existed at the time of trial, Graham's remedy, if any, lies in a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel rather than in collateral review of his
guilt or innocence. 244
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that
"[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ...to
have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence. '245 The right to effective
counsel is not only a Sixth Amendment right, but is also considered a
right under Fourteenth Amendment due process and is therefore binding
235. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984).
236. Huff, supra note 18, at 586.
237. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697.
238. Id. at 695.
239. Id. at 694.
240. See, e.g., Ex parte Raborn, 658 S.W.2d 602 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983); see also, Tyron
D. Lewis, Incompetency of Counsel, 25 BAYLOR L. REV. 299, 304 (1973).
241. 658 S.W.2d 602 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983).
242. Id. at 605.
243. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 680.
244. Graham did raise this claim, but the Court of Criminal Appeals refused to grant
relief on those grounds. Ex parte Graham, 853 S.W.2d 565, 565 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).
245. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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on the states.246 In addition to these federal guarantees, the Texas Con-
stitution also provides for a right to be heard by counsel.247
Historically, the United States Supreme Court has gradually expanded
the meaning of the "right to counsel." In 1932, the Court first held that
the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments required states to provide assist-
ance of counsel to persons charged with committing a capital crime.248 In
1938, the Court extended this right to defendants in all federal criminal
prosecutions, whether or not the defendant was charged with a capital
crime.249 Four years later, the Court held that in noncapital state cases,
the defendant's right to counsel was to be determined on a case-by-case
basis according to the particular circumstances and difficulties of the
case. 250 In Gideon v. Wainwright, the Court overruled the above reason-
ing and held that the right to counsel was applicable to state defendants
under the Due Process Clause; therefore, states were required to provide
indigent defendants with counsel in all felony cases. 251 Finally, the Court
expanded the right to counsel to include all cases in which imprisonment
might be imposed.252
Typically, the states have utilized two systems for providing indigent
defendants with counsel for their defense: the assignment and defender
systems.253 In an assignment system, judges select private practice attor-
neys to represent certain clients, either by a rotation system or at ran-
dom.254 The problem with this system is that, while it does spread the
responsibility out among the members of the bar, many private practice
lawyers are inexperienced in criminal law and are therefore not accus-
tomed to dealing with indigent clients. This combination tends to breed
in the attorneys an attitude of resentment and callousness toward the de-
fendants.255 In a defender system, attorneys are hired by the state or
county to defend indigent clients on a continual basis. 256 This system pro-
duces representation by attorneys with more criminal law experience and
a larger collection of resources. 257
Regardless of the system employed, however, "[t]hat a person who
happens to be a lawyer is present at trial alongside the accused ... is not
246. Huff, supra note 18, at 588.
247. "In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have.., the right of being heard by
himself or counsel, or both .... TEX. CONST. art. I, § 10.
248. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932); see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 684.
249. Hernandez v. Texas, 726 S.W.2d 53, 71 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (citing Johnson v.
Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938)); see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 684.
250. Hernandez, 726 S.W.2d at 72 (citing Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942)).
251. Id. (citing Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)); see also Strickland, 466 U.S.
at 684.
252. Huff, supra note 18, at 589 (citing Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972)); see
also Hernandez, 726 S.W.2d at 72.
253. Huff, supra note 18, at 594.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 603-604.
256. Id. at 594.
257. Id. at 604. Some critics argue that in order to make representation equal for both
paying and nonpaying defendants, indigent defendants must be provided with a good crim-
inal lawyer, not merely a good lawyer. Id. at 593.
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enough to satisfy the constitutional command. '258 Commentator Richard
Huff suggests that in order to provide equal protection for indigent cli-
ents, the appointed counsel should provide quality representation:
Counsel for an indigent defendant should be appointed promptly.
Counsel should be afforded a reasonable opportunity to prepare to
defend an accused. Counsel must confer with his client without un-
due delay and as often as necessary, to advise him of his rights and to
elicit matters of defense or to ascertain that potential defenses are
unavailable. Counsel must conduct appropriate investigations, both
factual and legal, to determine if matters of defense can be devel-
oped, and to allow himself enough time for reflection and prepara-
tion for trial.259
Courts have had difficulty articulating a test for determining whether
or not a defendant has received effective assistance. What is fairly consis-
tent, however, is that this standard is not high. 260 The courts, when re-
viewing effectiveness of counsel, begin with a strong presumption that the
representation was reasonable; the defendant must then prove that the
representation in fact fell below some standard.261 The majority of juris-
dictions require only that the defense counsel did not reduce the trial to a
"sham, farce, or mockery of justice. '' 262 Many have argued that the
"mockery" or "farce" test is not sufficient to protect a defendant's consti-
tutional rights.263 An alternate, and some argue more appropriate, test is
"whether or not the accused was convicted on the merits of the case, and
not by the neglect or default of his attorney. ''264
The Fifth Circuit employs a slightly higher standard for judging effec-
tiveness. The standard articulated is that the attorney must be "reason-
ably likely to render and rendering reasonably effective assistance. '265
The court later clarified that standard and added that the representation
must be "at least equal to that expected from compensated counsel of an
accused's own choosing. '266
In 1984, the United States Supreme Court attempted to articulate a
federal standard for determining the effectiveness of counsel based on
objective reasonableness and held that the defendant must prove that his
counsel's performance fell below the prevailing professional norms.267
The Court went on to say that the same standard should apply in all at-
258. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 685.
259. Huff, supra note 18, at 591 (quoting Coles v. Peyton, 389 F.2d 224, 226 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 849 (1968)).
260. Id. at 590.
261. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690.
262. Huff, supra note 18, at 590; Lewis, supra note 240, at 300.
263. Lewis, supra note 240, at 316.
264. Id. at 317.
265. Huff, supra note 18, at 590 (quoting MacKenna v. Ellis, 280 F.2d 592, 599, modi-
fied, 289 F.2d 928 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 877 (1961)); Ex parte Raborn, 658
S.W.2d at 602; see also Ex parte Duffy, 607 S.W.2d 507 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).
266. Huff, supra note 18, at 591 (quoting Johnson v. United States, 328 F.2d 605, 606
(5th Cir. 1964)).
267. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690.
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tacks on conviction, whether by direct appeal, motion for new trial, or
collateral habeas corpus proceeding. 268
In Hernandez v. Texas269 the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals ad-
dressed the issue of whether or not the Texas Constitution requires a
higher standard than that articulated in Strickland.270 The court held that
Texas courts "will follow in full the Strickland standards. '271 This stan-
dard of reasonableness, however, now adopted by the United States
Supreme Court as well as Texas courts, is very vague.
In reality, courts seem to "proceed on a case by case basis, recognizing
that the guidelines are too indefinite to distinguish the effective from the
ineffective, the competent from the incompetent and the diligent from the
indifferent. '272 Courts have found that a defendant's counsel was so inef-
fective as to prejudice the defendant's rights in several circumstances, in-
cluding when there was a lack of awareness of a basic rule of law
important to the defense,2 73 a conflict of interest,2 74 a lack of pre-trial
investigation and preparation,2 75 or a failure to pursue or enter an in-
sanity defense.276 On the other hand, courts have found that counsel was
not so ineffective as to deprive a defendant of his constitutional right to
counsel merely because the attorney gave what turned out to be bad ad-
vice 277 or because the attorney was inexperienced. 278
By increasing the quality of representation at the trial level, the system
can hopefully avoid eleventh hour claims from defendants who allege
that they possess exonerating evidence. Increasing accuracy at the trial
level is an efficient safeguard for defendants' rights. There are, however,
two costs to this type of remedy. First, the system must be financed and
better lawyers are apt to cost taxpayers more; but this cost could be offset
by a reduction in the amount of collateral review that society tolerates
once it becomes more confident of the accuracy of the conviction.2 79 Sec-
ond, extensive criticism of appointed counsel's performance and the
threat of being labeled "ineffective" could seriously affect the willingness
of some attorneys to serve in this capacity.280 Despite these costs, how-
ever, if the Texas courts would provide a meaningful remedy for ineffec-
268. Id. at 697.
269. 726 S.W.2d 53 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986).
270. Id. at 54. Judge Clinton, however, in his concurring opinion, maintained that the
issue of whether or not the Texas Constitution requires a higher standard of review for
ineffective assistance of counsel than does the United States Constitution was not before
the court and, therefore, the court should not have issued an advisory opinion on the issue.
Id. at 60, 63 (Clinton, J., concurring).
271. Id. at 57.
272. Joseph D. Grano, The Right to Counsel: Collateral Issues Affecting Due Process,
54 MINN. L. REV. 1175, 1242 (1970).
273. Lewis, supra note 240, at 303.
274. Id.
275. Id. at 304.
276. Id. at 306.
277. Id. at 302-03.
278. Lewis, supra note 240, at 302.
279. Friendly, supra note 17, at 145.
280. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690.
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tive assistance of counsel, additional procedural safeguards for claims of
actual innocence would be unnecessary.
X. CONCLUSION
In its latest decision, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals took the
position that, while an otherwise constitutionally valid conviction should
not be set aside lightly, a convicted felon who can meet the articulated
threshold standard must be allowed to seek state habeas corpus relief on
the basis of newly discovered evidence.281 This decision overrules prece-
dent,2s2 and gives every convicted inmate a "crowbar to open the door to
a state forum in our trial courts ... to relitigate his conviction years after
he or she has already enjoyed every protection our criminal justice system
extends to those individuals who were, at one time, presumptively
innocent." 283
This decision is inappropriate given the fact that there are better and
more efficient ways to guarantee the guilt of defendants, including our
clemency system and ineffective assistance of counsel claims. In fact, if
the Court of Criminal Appeals believed that Graham had alibi witnesses
available and his counsel did not call those witnesses, its denial of his
ineffective assistance claim is hard to understand. 2s4 Furthermore, the
court only vacated the civil court's injunction; the civil court apparently
can continue with Graham's appeal concerning the adequacy of the clem-
ency process.285 The dissent pointed out that it "seems odd for the major-
ity to allow that lawsuit to proceed while suggesting that Graham should
raise another claim in another forum."286 In the author's view, this deci-
sion is not only odd, but also unnecessary and imprudent, having the po-
tential to "open a crack in the prison walls through which a flood of
convicts may escape. '287 At the very least, one more layer has been ad-
ded to the seemingly endless buildup of procedural protections for death
row inmates.
281. State ex rel. Holmes, 1994 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 52, at *29-30.
282. Id. at *28-29 (overruling Ex parte Binder, 660 S.W.2d 103 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983)).
283. Id. at *48 (White, J., concurring and dissenting).
284. See Ex parte Graham, 853 S.W.2d 565 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).
285. State ex rel. Holmes, 1994 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 52, at *96 (Clinton, J.,
dissenting).
286. Id.
287. Smith, supra note 22, at 4.
1994]

